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Abstract 
This article examines three connected campaigns for Indian imperial citizenship which spanned the 
period 1890 to 1919, and their impact on the emergence of radical South Asian anticolonialism. It 
shifts our focus from individuals and ideologues who sought the status of British imperial citizens, to 
address the agitations which commenced to attain such a status within a reconstructed British Empire. 
Specific attention is paid to the conditions which encouraged South Asian patriots to imagine that the 
ideal of equal imperial citizenship within an imperial federation was a feasible political objective, to 
the illiberal official retreat from such an ideal, and to the political ramifications of this retreat. In 
conclusion, this article argues that the quest for Indian imperial citizenship, which spanned the Empire 
from South Africa to Canada, has been a much-neglected chapter in the evolution of anti-colonial 
nationalism in South Asia which deserves to be reinserted in the grand meta-narrative of the region’s 
20th century history.   
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In November 1954, Henry Hopkins, the British Colonial Secretary, remarked during a House 
of Commons debate: 
In a world in which restrictions on personal movement and immigration have 
increased we can still take pride in the fact that a man can say Civis Britannicus sum, 
whatever his colour may be, and we take pride in the fact that he wants and can come 
to the mother country.1 
 
Six years earlier, the new British Nationality Act of 1948 made explicit the rights of ‘citizens 
of the United Kingdom and Colonies’ and new ‘Commonwealth Citizens’ to enter and settle 
in their ‘mother country’.2 Such rights had theoretically long existed. As the Lord Chancellor 
reminded Parliament when it debated the 1948 Act, a British subject (when in Britain, at 
least) could already enter and depart the country at any time, qualify for the franchise, 
become a member of the Privy Council or of Parliament, join the Civil Service (except in 
wartime and certain other circumstances) and ‘own a British ship’.3  Yet, it was only with the 
same Act’s introduction that subjecthood entered the statute book as officially signifying 
citizenship. As Britain withdrew from its former colonial possessions, the declaration of 
current and former subjects as British citizens made political and economic sense. 
Immigrants who could claim Civis Britannicus sum, it was thought, would solve Britain’s 
postwar labour shortage while at the same time shoring up the unity of the nascent 
Commonwealth from which many would arrive.4  
The story of what transpired has been well told. Racially-incited violence in 1959 
contributed to the British government’s imposition of the first checks on Commonwealth 
immigration in 1962. Further restrictions followed, overseen by both Labour and 
Conservative governments, under the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts of 1968 and the 
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Immigration Act of 1971.5 Eventually, the death of Civis Britannicus reached its painful 
historical postscript with the ignominious ‘Windrush scandal’ of 2018, during which 
Commonwealth citizens and their descendants who had settled in Britain were threatened by 
the Home Office with the removal of their social benefits and deportation. In part as a 
consequence of a staggering case of administrative amnesia, the British government had 
stamped out the final embers of a long-held liberal imperial ideal.  
Yet this was not the first time that the principle of Civis Britannicus had been 
trumpeted by politicians before being dismantled and abandoned as they struggled to manage 
the complex societal changes it engendered. This article explores the causes and 
consequences of a previous official retreat that occurred through the period 1893 to 1919 
when Indians, through a series of globally influential and interconnected campaigns, claimed 
and sought to exercise their rights as British citizens, only to discover the gulf that lay 
between liberal imperial rhetoric and reality. Importantly, this quest for imperial citizenship 
became much more than the elitist aspiration of a moderate Western-educated Indian 
minority devoted to constitutional modes of agitation – a trivial sideshow when compared 
with the mass nationalist mobilizations in the decades which followed that sought to end 
British rule. Rather, as this article will show, the liberal ideal of imperial citizenship played a 
neglected role in the evolution of Indian anticolonial radicalism, becoming, because of its 
subversive potential, of great concern to colonial officialdom.   
Campaigns for imperial citizenship by colonized peoples have not featured heavily in 
the study of British decolonization. The scholarship that exists focuses either on the 
theorizing of imperial citizenship by European ideologues or the invention and performance 
of imperial citizenship by Western-educated Indian elites.6 While this work has recovered 
ideas once obscured by nationalist emplotments in history-writing, it mostly examines 
individuals and their aspirations rather than agitations and mobilizations, and thus reinforces 
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an impression, as one reviewer has expressed it, that the ideal of imperial citizenship emerged 
as a fleeting political ambition which never made the transition from inspiring ‘individual 
careers’ to ‘becoming a viable political program’.7  
Beyond the British case, however, work by Frederick Cooper, the noted historian of 
colonial Africa, has begun to reshape the field. Cooper has taken aim at a nationalist 
historiography that privileges ‘a politics of unremitting struggle against an impenetrable 
colonial edifice rather than forms of political action and claim-making that depended on 
overlapping idioms and interaction between colonizer and colonized’. For Cooper, both kinds 
of politics combined to bring down European empires. One form threatened the destruction of 
colonial regimes through unified (often violent) resistance; the other challenged these 
regimes ‘with the possibility that political action would produce concrete gains for different 
categories of people’ and that ‘ideologies might be reconfigured’, and that notions of the 
‘politically possible or excluded might shift’.8  
Cooper’s masterful study of decolonization in French West Africa between 1945 and 
1960 reveals that conceptions held by both French and African leaders of future imperial 
citizenship within a Franco-African federation produced tangible political results. The 
negotiations both sides engaged in to realize their common, yet differently conceived, 
federation hopes produced a ‘succession of concessions and reconfigurations’ from which 
‘France’s African population got something quite important – the rights of a French citizen: 
to free speech, free assembly and equal justice, and, by 1956, to universal suffrage; and to 
freedom of movement’.9 The present article builds on Cooper’s approach to examine the 
political struggles waged from at least five decades earlier for equal Indian citizenship within 
a British-Asian imperial federation. But this study also highlights the striking differences 
between both cases. By comparison with post-1945 French West Africa, a ‘succession of 
concessions’ on the part of the British did not eventuate. Rather, Indian claims for imperial 
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citizenship produced a series of illiberal reconfigurations designed to limit the rights of non-
Europeans and jettison any assumptions that they may have had as to how far they shared in 
such rights.  
It is in addressing the political ramifications of this contest, characterized by series of 
claims made and official retreats, that the present article seeks to break new ground. For, as 
political leaders from and within India publicly tested the limits of imperial citizenship, 
threatening to expose the illiberal reality of British imperialism in the process, their quest 
became itself a radicalizing agent, one conducted with the implicit understanding, which 
ultimately became an explicit threat, that failure would result in the complete unbinding of 
the Empire.   
 
Subjects as citizens: rights of belonging to the late British Empire 
How, and in what ways, did Indians by the start of the 20th century come to imagine their 
imperial subjecthood constituted an equal imperial citizenship? 
Since the 17th century, the definition of a British subject included all those who owed 
allegiance to the crown by dint of their birth within the sovereign’s domains, a status which 
the British Nationality Act of 1914 eventually codified to include any person born within the 
formal British Empire, or who claimed descent from a British subject father, or who became 
naturalized in Britain or its colonial possessions. As the political scientist Randal Hansen has 
noted, ‘a basic feature of the doctrine underpinning allegiance is indivisibility; all subjects 
enjoy precisely the same relationship with the monarch and no distinction can be made 
among them’.10 The logical corollary of this, as the young lawyer Mohandas Gandhi was 
quick to realize, was that privileges enjoyed by some loyal subjects ought to be enjoyed 
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equally by others – in particular, the right to move and settle across the British Empire which 
Europeans had enjoyed from its beginning. As Empire-born Indian lascars discovered, this 
principle of indivisibility was in practice not always observed. The British Parliament in 
1815, to limit their entry into Britain, amended the Navigation Acts to effectively deprive 
them of their subject status.11 Nevertheless, the possibility of equal rights of imperial mobility 
and settlement returned from the mid-19th century as Britain adopted a more laissez faire 
attitude to immigration, as it did to trade.  
In 1849, the classical liberal state in Britain repealed the Navigation Acts as the free 
movement of persons, along with their goods and their ideas, increasingly became a 
legitimizing trope of mid-Victorian imperialism. The global steamship revolution which took 
hold from the 1840s resulted in the arrival of many more lascars in Britain and their 
settlement in port-cities such as Southampton and Liverpool.12 Their movement to the 
imperial centre was one part of a series of migration waves, coerced and voluntary,  that 
occurred within and across the Empire over the remainder of the century and the first four 
decades of the next. Labour-intensive plantation and mining enterprises, from Trinidad, 
Mauritius and Ceylon, to Burma, Malaya, Natal and eventually Fiji, drew overseas Chinese 
and Indian workers. In India, overseas population movements were supported by colonial 
officials who explicitly maintained the right of Indians to move and settle anywhere across 
the Empire. As a senior official remarked in 1914, ‘the policy of the Government of India has 
been to contend for the principle that there should be complete freedom for all British 
subjects to transfer themselves from one part of the Empire to another’.13  
Grand plans hatched in the imperial capital reinforced this notion of free imperial 
movement and settlement. At the end of the nineteenth century, former and serving colonial 
civil servants, supported by their allies in the metropolitan London press, plotted to 
redistribute India’s ‘superfluous’ population across parts of the Empire whose economic 
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development, it was thought, would benefit. Indian subjects were deemed better suited for 
such work in the tropical climes of Africa than Europeans, and even on occasion spoken of as 
laying a similar claim to being ‘civilizers’.14 Meanwhile, the British government displayed its 
increasing willingness to intervene beyond its borders to protect its far-flung subjects. The 
most famous formulation of British subjecthood as British citizenship came in 1850, when 
Lord Palmerston, speaking in Parliament, invoked St Paul’s defence in the Acts of the 
Apostles:   
As the Roman, in days of old, held himself free from indignity, when he could 
say, civis Romanus sum, so also a British subject, in whatever land he may be, shall 
feel confident that the watchful eye and the strong arm of England will protect him 
from injustice and wrong.15 
 
Palmerston made this statement at the end of his lengthy justification of his decision 
to send British gunboats to Piraeus to seek redress from the Greek government on behalf of a 
Gibraltar-born Portuguese Jew called David Pacifico. Three years earlier, Pacifico, who had 
previously served as Portuguese consul to Greece, had seen his Athens home ransacked by an 
anti-Semitic Greek mob. Whether or not the ‘Don Pacifico Affair’ exerted much impact east 
of Aden, the protection the British Crown afforded its subjects became known of and sought 
after across the Empire, especially by ocean-crossing traders. Legislation in 1852 that was 
renewed in 1867 enabled China-born merchants operating in the Straits Settlements of 
Singapore, Melaka and Penang to apply for naturalization as British subjects. Several did, as 
British subjecthood provided security for their ships, and an insurance against the vagaries of 
laws and taxes imposed by the Qing officials they dealt with back in China. At the start of the 
new century, Straits-born Chinese, all of whom were legally British subjects and some of 
whom had dealings in China, strove to remind British authorities of their status once it 
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appeared that the Qing government might move to claim them as its own nationals under the 
principle of jus sanguinis. 16   
 The notion of imperial citizenship was also encouraged by high-profile British 
commitments to the future political rights that subjecthood promised. Queen Victoria’s 1858 
Proclamation to the ‘Princes, Chiefs and People of India’, which was delivered following the 
suppression of the 1857 Indian Rebellion, held the crown ‘bound to the natives of our Indian 
territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects, and these 
obligations by the blessing of Almighty God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil.’ 
To commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of this Proclamation, King Edward VII bestowed 
upon India one of his own. Commenting on the extension of representative institutions of 
government across the Subcontinent, he noted that ‘the time has come when, in the 
judgement of my Viceroy and Governor General and others of my counsellors, that principle 
may be prudently extended.’ His 1908 Proclamation continued: 
Important classes among you, representing ideas that have been fostered and 
encouraged by British rule, claim equality of citizenship and a greater share in the 
legislation and Government. The politic satisfaction of such a claim will strengthen 
not impair existing authority and power.17  
 
By this time, official and non-official discussions in the imperial metropolis regularly 
conflated subjecthood and citizenship, without clearly defining or distinguishing one idea 
from the other.  A prominent imperial commentator observed in 1911 ‘how loosely’ these 
terms  ‘are used and interchanged even by the Empire’s leading statesmen’: ‘Such phrases as 
the “rights of British citizenship,” or the “rights of British subjects,” or the “liberties” of one 
or other, are frequently used in protest against legislative or administrative action which the 
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responsible parties uphold as perfectly legitimate.’ 18 Of greater importance to Indians who 
had access to these debates were their countrymen who journeyed to Britain to lay claim to 
their common rights as British subjects and successfully exercise them. In the 1880s and 
1890s, the Liberal Party of Great Britain fielded three Indian candidates in General Elections. 
The two unsuccessful candidates were the Middle Temple-educated barristers Lalmohan 
Ghose and W. C. Bonnerjee. The successful candidate was the Parsi merchant, scholar and 
Indian National Congress leader Dadabhai Naoroji, who was elected MP for Central Finsbury 
in 1892 on a platform which included his support for Irish home rule. In 1895, the 
Conservative Party fielded the Bombay-born barrister Mancherjee Bhownagree as the 
candidate for the North-East Bethnal Green seat in London, which he won and held until 
1906. In one of the perversities of this era, Bhownagree was elected on a Tory anti-
immigration ticket directed at recent East European Jewish arrivals in London.19 For his 
efforts, The Eastern Argus and Borough of Hackney Times vaunted Bhownagree as ‘a true 
British citizen – acquainted with all those varied conditions of administration which makes 
the name of Britain great throughout the world today’.20  
 
 
Gandhi’s test of imperial citizenship: rights-claiming in South Africa  
India’s most famous agitator for equal imperial citizenship was Mohandas Gandhi, who took 
great heart from the electoral success of Dadabhai Naoroji. For his South African crusade 
from 1893 and 1914, to revoke anti-Indian discriminatory legislation that restricted their 
immigration, their freedom to move, live, trade and own property across South African 
territories, and their right (for those few who initially qualified) to vote, Gandhi has been 
labelled a ‘collaborative nationalist’.21 A key element within and between these campaigns 
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were Gandhi’s public avowals of his Empire-allegiance, such as through his organization of 
volunteer ambulance corps during the Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 and Zulu 
Rebellion of 1906. However, the extent to which his loyalty formed a complementary 
strategy in his overall quest for equal imperial rights has been little discussed. Likewise, the 
extent to which his efforts drew metropolitan imperial support, coming to be regarded as a 
test-case of imperial citizenship that would determine the liberal future of the British Empire, 
has received scant attention.22 
 From the outset, Gandhi built his case for Indian rights in South Africa around the 
principle of the indivisibility of subjecthood upheld through Queen Victoria’s 1858 
Proclamation. In his speeches, pamphlets, petitions and newspaper articles, he referred to the 
Proclamation as ‘justly and rightly called the Magna Charta of the Indians’ and the Indian’s 
‘Charter of Liberty’,23  a document that guaranteed Indians ‘the same rights and privileges as 
are enjoyed by Her Majesty’s other subjects’ under ‘the same principle of political equality 
that enabled Mr Naoroji to enter the House of Commons’.24 Victoria had given her royal 
promise that all her subjects would be treated ‘on a footing of equality without distinction of 
race, colour or creed’.25 On Gandhi’s lecture tour of India in 1896, he announced: ‘We belong 
to the Imperial family and are children, adopted it may be, of the same august mother, having 
the same rights and privileges guaranteed to us as to the European children. It was in that 
belief that we went to the Colony of Natal, and we trust that our belief was well founded’.26 
The endorsement which Gandhi’s views received in London underlines Nicholas 
Owen’s depiction of the city during this era as the liberal ‘soft heart’ of the British Empire.27 
Gandhi’s South African campaign was naturally taken up in Westminster by Naoroji and 
subsequently Bhownaggreee. It was also supported in The Star, a radical newspaper founded 
by an Irish nationalist which enjoyed a circulation in the 1890s of roughly 150,000.28 In the 
late-1890s, Gandhi’s principal ally was The Times, which gave extensive coverage to his 
11 
 
agitation. An editorial from 1895 recognized the right of Indians to move to and settle in 
South Africa, as well as their fundamental importance to its economic development, and 
called upon the Colonial Office to ‘enlighten’ the ‘ordinary colonist’ to recognize ‘a fellow-
subject in the Hindu or the Parsee’ and ensure ‘fair treatment is extended to British subjects 
of whatever colour.’29  
Gandhi’s key supporter at the Times was Sir William Wilson Hunter, a former Indian 
civil servant and the author of the paper’s weekly ‘Indian Affairs’ column. Hunter, while he 
noted that the Proclamation of 1858 was ‘no Declaration des droits de l’homme’, fully 
supported Gandhi’s stance on the full rights of imperial citizenship it pledged Indians.30 
Hunter argued that since British officials had ‘laid down the principle of the “equal rights” 
and equal privileges of all British subjects in regard to redress from foreign States’, the matter 
was not now ‘a question of argument but of race feeling’. The attempt of the Natal authorities 
to ‘deny the rights of citizenship to British Indian subjects’ was in addition wrong because 
‘by years of thrift and good work in the Colony’ Indians had ‘raised themselves to the actual 
status of citizens’. In other columns, Hunter expanded his views on the economic case for 
Indian imperial citizenship: ‘It is a mockery to urge our Indian fellow-subjects to embark on 
external commerce if the moment they leave India they lose their rights as British subjects 
and can be treated by foreign governments as a degraded and an outcaste race.’ He also drew 
attention to the blood Indian soldiers had sacrificed to win their equal status: ‘it would be 
violation of the British sense of justice to use the blood and the valour of these races in war 
and yet to deny them the protection of the British name in the enterprise of peace.’ 31 
Gandhi deployed this metropolitan sanction in a circulatory exchange of print through 
which the rights-claiming idiom he shared with his metropolitan allies merged. The London 
newspapers to which Gandhi sent his petitions and pamphlets published summaries of, and 
commentaries on, his works. Gandhi obtained copies of these through the weekly editions 
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these publications sent out to South Africa and other parts of the Empire via the imperial 
post. He then quoted excerpts from these summaries and commentaries as metropolitan 
testimonials in his ongoing campaign literature or repeated their language (often verbatim and 
sometimes unattributed) in his subsequent writings and speeches. Gandhi also circulated 
these metropolitan testimonials back in India. In this way, he made the congruence of his 
campaign with the liberal idealism of the imperial metropole a key feature of his platform, 
one which revealed how out of step the self-governing Colonies of the Empire were with the 
more enlightened ‘mother land’. In this way, too, Gandhi made his campaign a highly-visible 
example of fellow imperial citizenship in practice, through a political language that 
transcended racial divisions to reveal the bonds of sympathy between fellow British 
subjects.32  
Gandhi and Hunter both understood the Indian agitation in South Africa to have 
broader, global, political ramifications. Fully cognizant of moves to exclude Indians from 
entering Australia, New Zealand and Canada, Gandhi spoke of the South African situation as 
an ‘Indian question’ which had a ‘local as well as Imperial significance’.33 Meanwhile, 
Hunter advised his readers that: ‘it is in Southern Africa that this question of their [the 
Indians’] status must be determined. If they secure the position of British subjects in South 
Africa, it would be almost impossible to deny it to them elsewhere. If they fail to secure that 
position in South Africa, it will be extremely difficult for them to attain it elsewhere.’34 
Moreover, both men’s demands for Indian imperial citizenship carried a warning and, in 
Gandhi’s case, an implicit threat. In 1897, while Gandhi was delayed in his disembarkation at 
Durban by an angry white mob, he remarked to a journalist upon the ill ‘effects’ of South 
African discrimination: ‘not only through the colony, but throughout the British Empire, 
more especially the Indian Empire…it will give the Indians a sort of feeling that will not be 
got rid of easily’. For the Empire ‘to remain in harmony’, he argued, Indian rights had to be 
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respected.35 Subsequently, he warned that the ‘exclusive policy’ of the self-governing 
Colonies was ‘making a deep impression on the minds of the Indian people, and it cannot but 
make the task of government in India more and more difficult.’36  
The alarms sounded in The Times were, if anything, starker and more portentous. 
Hunter warned in 1896: ‘We cannot afford a war of races among our own subjects’.37 A 
decade later, an especially foreboding editorial in the same paper lamented the ‘lapse of 
years, and perhaps of generation’ that ‘may be needed to create, if indeed it ever can be 
created, such a spirit of common Imperial citizenship as will greatly mitigate the combined 
force of race prejudice and of self-interest’. It went on to describe the ‘the graver injury’ that 
the present falsehood of imperial citizenship ‘threatens to do us, amongst our Asiatic fellow-
subjects, and chiefly among our fellow-subjects in India’, when these subjects, through their 
humiliating experiences overseas, ‘discover that the doctrines which they have heard from 
professorial and official lips are in fact unreal’. Of special concern were the poorer classes of 
Indians abroad, ‘pedlars, small traders, shopkeepers and coolies’, who would return home to 
spread amongst their villages accounts of their mistreatment ‘at the hands of British colonists, 
without interference or protection from the British raj’:  
A more dangerous body of missionaries of discontent can hardly be imagined…This 
conflict of rights and of interests is naturally inflaming passions and prejudices in the 
colonies and in India, which sap and blast the Imperial patriotism that must bind the 
Empire together, if the Empire is to last.38 
 
Ensuring a segregated empire: illiberal reconfigurations at the centre 
The imperial dilemma which Gandhi’s agitation in South Africa posed Whitehall officials 
was captured in an internal Colonial Office minute of March 1897, which observed: ‘The 
whole subject is perhaps the most difficult we have to deal with. The Colonies wish to 
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exclude the Indians from spreading themselves all over the Empire. If we agree, we are liable 
to forfeit the loyalty of the Indians. If we do not agree we forfeit the loyalty of the 
Colonists’.39 As Gandhi had committed his energies to his South African agitation in the mid-
1890s, the British government had knocked back, or made clear it would veto, immigration 
bills in the self-governing Colonies which explicitly barred Asian immigration on racial 
grounds. In addition to Natal, Australia and New Zealand had pushed for the exclusion of 
Indian immigrants, in what has been called a ‘prophylactic’ measure (given the then lack of 
such immigration), one demanded by white-supremacist politicians eager to build unifying 
nationalist platforms based not only on fears of a present ‘yellow peril’ but a future ‘brown’ 
invasion.40 
  At the London Colonial Conference of 1897, Joseph Chamberlain, as Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, expressed his sympathy ‘with the white inhabitants of these colonies 
which are in comparatively close proximity to millions and hundreds of millions of Asiatics’. 
Yet he reminded the assembled colonial premiers of the ‘traditions of the Empire which make 
no distinction in favour of, or against, race or colour’. His blunt advice was that any 
exclusion of imperial subjects ‘by reason of their colour or by reason of their race…would be 
an act so offensive to those people that it would be most painful, I am certain, to Her Majesty 
to have to sanction it’. Nevertheless, Chamberlain indicated that restrictions based on 
education, along the lines of the Natal Act of 1897, which required immigrants to prove their 
knowledge of a European language before entry, would be ‘absolutely satisfactory’.41 
Thereafter, Australia introduced similar legislation in 1901 which resulted in the country’s 
infamous ‘dictation test’. Canada, in 1906, as we shall shortly see, also introduced legislation 
to exclude the entry of Indian subjects without making race the explicit grounds for this.42   
In this manner, Chamberlain oversaw a reconfiguration in official thinking regarding 
Civis Britannicus to accommodate race feelings in the Empire’s settler colonies. However, 
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these colonies’ illiberal influence did not end there. At the 1907 Colonial Conference, the 
Australian and New Zealand premiers resorted to bullish reassertions of their white-only 
political visions as if resentful of earlier Whitehall efforts to muzzle them. Alfred Deakin, the 
Prime Minister of Australia, announced that he was ‘determined to have a white Australia’, 
and ‘keep it white’: ‘we will have a white Australia, cost us what it may. We are anxious to 
let everyone know it’. Joseph Ward, the New Zealand premier, proclaimed that ‘New Zealand 
is a white man’s country, and intends to remain a white man’s country; we intend to keep our 
country for white men by every effort in our power’.43 When the matter of Civis Britannicus 
was debated, these leaders, along with the representatives of South Africa’s Transvaal and 
Cape Colony, pushed for what was, in effect, a two-tiered British subjecthood which 
accorded equal rights to white subjects but withheld them from non-Europeans.  
The catalyst for this reconfiguration were anomalies in the imperial system of 
naturalization which meant that, owing to differing criteria applied across the Empire, a 
naturalized British subject in the colony where they had been granted naturalization did not 
enjoy it in other colonies. The draft bill intended to resolve this issue generated anxiety 
amongst colonial premiers because it potentially enabled ‘coloured’ immigrants naturalized 
in parts of the Empire, such as Britain and the Straits Settlements, where exclusion on racial 
grounds was not in force to legally proceed to enter and settle in the self-governing Colonies. 
Prime Minister Louis de Botha of the Transvaal requested that naturalization granted in one 
colony ‘should have effect beyond the borders of such Colony only when granted to a person 
of European birth or descent.’ Dr Thomas Smartt, the Cape Colony Commissioner of Lands 
and Public Works, summed up the overall opinion of the Conference when he stated that it 
supported the principle that naturalized British subjects should ‘have all the rights and 
privileges of British citizenship’ in ‘any Colony’ if the issue of ‘the non-Europeans’ could be 
settled. Smartt sought a modification to the government’s draft bill so as not to allow non-
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Europeans ‘ipso facto, to claim the rights of British citizenship in British possessions.’ The 
Home Secretary Herbert Gladstone replied that although such an amendment would ‘simplify 
matters’ it was ‘a matter of very considerable difficulty’.44 
The issue lay unresolved until the 1911 Imperial Conference, which Winston 
Churchill attended as Home Secretary. When the Dominion delegates returned to discuss 
Empire-wide naturalization, Wilfred Laurier, the Canadian Prime Minister, affirmed his 
support for the principle of ‘a British subject anywhere, a British subject everywhere…In 
other words, civis Britannicus is civis Britannicus not only in the country of naturalization, 
but everywhere’. Laurier then subsequently admitted that ‘the colour question’ was ‘really 
the true difficulty at the bottom of every mind here, that you may naturalise a class of subject 
generally undesirable.’ Joseph Ward registered New Zealand’s support for the ideal of 
common imperial citizenship as long as it did not impinge on her power to exclude Asian 
imperial subjects. F. S. Malan, the Minister of Education for South Africa, also gave his 
support, provided local legislation continued to prevent the full transfer of the rights of Civis 
Britannicus from the ‘country of naturalization’ to ‘every other part of the Empire’. Malan’s 
reformulation of Civis Britannicus was a restatement of the two-tiered notion of imperial 
rights aired at the 1907 conference, delivered with an Orwellian twist: ‘A British subject 
anywhere in the Empire is a British subject everywhere in the Empire, but you do not 
necessarily give him all the rights of a British subject in all parts of the Empire.’ 45  
Churchill’s solution to the ‘colour question’ was, like Chamberlain before him, to 
transform it into an ostensible matter of class. He likened the autonomy of the Dominion 
governments to differentiate between imperial subjects to that which the British government 
exercised when it distinguished ‘between different classes of white British subjects. We do 
not, for instance, put peers on the register for voting; and there are many distinctions which 
you draw in the Colonies.’ Happy with this formula, the Conference agreed to the resolution 
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that ‘the effectiveness of local law regulating immigration and the like or differentiating 
between different classes of British subjects’ would be assured, a stipulation that was entered 
into the statute books as part of the British Nationality and Status of Alien Act of 1914. 46  
However, the Conference’s deliberations upon Civis Britannicus did not pass without 
an intervention from a concerned India Office. Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, 
pleaded with the assembled delegates for their governments to show a more ‘accommodating 
and friendly spirit’ toward Indian immigration. In recognizing their ‘undoubted liberty’ to 
determine ‘the rules of their own citizenship’ and immigration policies, Crewe conceded that 
the ‘natural right’ of every British subject ‘to travel or still more to settle in any part of the 
Empire’ was no longer tenable. Yet he warned of the momentous political stakes in play 
surrounding ‘this difficulty between the white races and the native races’ that threatened ‘not 
merely the well being, but the actual existence, of the Empire as an Empire’. Crewe 
maintained that the ‘question’ of ‘Indian disability in any part of the British Empire’ was in 
India one that united ‘all classes and all creeds and political schools’, both loyal and anti-
imperial. It was a particular asset to the latter because it put in their hands ‘a weapon which 
they are not slow to use in attacking us. If, they ask, Indians are to suffer from disabilities in 
various parts of the Empire, what good is the British connection at all?’47  
Crewe addressed the Conference with Gandhi’s ongoing South African agitation 
clearly in mind. Three years later, Gandhi concluded this campaign, having launched his final 
satyagraha to mobilize Indian indentured labourers as well as Indian women. While his 
experiments with non-violent mobilization were certainly a success, his agitation achieved 
only a partial victory for Indian imperial rights. The South African Indian Relief Act of 1914, 
which officially recognized Indian marriages, abolished the poll tax on Indian settlers, eased 
certain restrictions on their internal movement, and permitted educated Indians to immigrate, 
may have been applauded by Gandhi as another ‘Magna Carta’ of Indian liberty.48 Yet 
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Indians in South Africa still remained restricted in their purchase and ownership of property, 
in where they could live and trade, and they were still denied the franchise.  
 
Gurdit Singh and the Komagata Maru saga: a second test of imperial citizenship 
No sooner was Gandhi’s quest for imperial citizenship in South Africa winding down than 
another campaign erupted, which in a similar vein threatened to expose the falseness of 
liberal imperial pretensions. In March 1914, the Singapore-based Gurdit Singh, a wealthy 
Sikh involved in the labour-contracting business, chartered the Komagata Maru, a Japanese-
registered steamer, to bring 376 would-be Indian migrants, 24 of whom were Muslims, 12 
Hindus and the remainder Sikhs, into Canada through Vancouver.49 Canada had been slower 
to legislate to exclude Indian imperial subjects than Australia, New Zealand and South 
Africa. In 1906, however, as Indian immigration grew, the government enacted a continuous 
journey requirement that prohibited entry to immigrants who were not arriving directly on 
through tickets from their country of nationality or domicile. These restrictions, which also 
required that Indian immigrants had in their possession at least 600 rupees to qualify for 
entry, were imposed by the Canadian authorities in the full knowledge that no such direct 
passages existed between India and Canada. In 1909, one year after their implementation, 
Indian arrivals plummeted from the previous total of 623 in 1908 to 6.50  
Gurdit Singh recalled that at a Sikh ‘sabha’ he had attended in Hong Kong, having 
arrived in the city in December 1913, he was challenged to help his Indian brethren. In 
response he hatched a plan to ‘vindicate our right of entering Canada’ by chartering a 
steamship ‘to fulfil the provisions of the existing law’ requiring continuous passage, and by 
raising 10,000 Canadian dollars ‘to be deposited in a Canadian Bank for the sureties of every 
individual of our community intending to land there’.51 Singh was seemingly encouraged by 
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the fact that in November 1913 56 Indian passengers aboard the Panama Maru steamer had 
gained entry to Canada by successfully appealing their case against the legislation designed 
to exclude them,.52 Yet their success merely led the Canadian authorities to re-write their 
immigration regulations more tightly. When, in late-May 1914, the Komagata Maru arrived 
in Vancouver waters, the Canadian authorities prevented it from docking. After a two-month 
ordeal which drew international attention, the ship and its passengers were escorted out of 
harbor by gunboats of the Royal Canadian Navy and forced to sail back to Calcutta. 
 Gurdit Singh clearly intended his voyage to be a test of imperial principles from the 
outset, one that would have, whichever way the result went, produce a significant political 
impact. In his personal account, he described his mission as ‘a test of the sincerity of the 
Government in framing the rules. If we complied with all the provisions…it was up to the 
Government to permit us to land and prove itself to be just and fair.’53 In the Punjabi 
prospectus for the voyage issued in February 1914, he proclaimed himself a champion of 
Indian rights who would ‘fight out this case in the Supreme Court in Canada for the decision 
in our favour forever. If the Canadian Government will persist, then I will ask the necessary 
questions from my British Government. I will not return back until the real result will be 
out’.54 He spoke similarly in an interview with an American journalist conducted on the eve 
of the Komagata Maru’s departure. When his interviewer asked him what would follow if he 
failed to gain satisfaction from the government of India as well as the courts in Canada, he 
reportedly responded (with a broad smile, while his companions gathered around him and 
laughed): ‘“I cannot answer”’.55  Critically, from its inception, his voyage was also 
understood by others in the same vein. Ahead of his Vancouver arrival, Canadian journalists, 
having received London cables which relayed German reports of his intentions, sarcastically 
referred to his voyage as Gurdit Singh’s ‘great experiment’.56 The British Ambassador to 
Japan, where the Komagata Maru stopped en route, reported back to the Foreign Office ‘of 
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the departure of 300 British Indians for Canada, to test the Immigration Laws of British 
Columbia’.57   
Indian responses to the plight of the Komagata Maru’s passengers on their arrival iN 
Canadian waters emphasized the abrogation of their rights as imperial citizens (and so 
revealed that the illiberal reconfiguration of Civis Britannicus secured at the heart of the 
Empire had yet to filter through to, or be acknowledged in, the periphery). Lahore’s Indian-
owned Tribune newspaper, conscious of ‘an opinion’ in British Indian circles that the ‘400 
Hindus’ onboard ‘have deliberately been courting trouble’ asked: ‘But what about the rights 
of Indians as British subjects?’.58 The London All-India Moslem League, in a protest 
delivered directly to the Colonial Office, warned of the ‘intense feeling of indignation’ that 
was brewing against not only Canada but the Imperial Government for the failure to protect 
‘the interests of His Majesty’s Asiatic subjects who, by right of imperial citizenship, consider 
themselves as much entitled to travel and settle in different parts of the Empire as the King’s 
British or Colonial subjects.’59  
The official British response was indicative of the anxieties that had been brewing 
since the commencement of efforts to reconfigure Civis Britannicus. In early-June 1914, the 
India Office cabled the Government of India for information as to ‘how Indian opinion views 
present incident and its significance, as compared with the South Africa question’.60 Viceroy 
Hardinge was informed by a senior member of his Council that although the impact of 
Gandhi’s South African agitation in India was ‘certainly more acute […] I doubt if it 
involved such dangerous issues’. Particularly concerning was ‘with what damaging effect the 
exclusion from another part of the Empire of Sikhs – men of a martial race that has done so 
much in the military service of the Crown – can be turned against us.’61 Hardinge, in his 
cabled reply to Whitehall, played down the potential for widespread agitation when compared 
with the ‘South Africa question’ while recognizing the threat to British authority in the Sikh-
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dominated parts of the Punjab.62 Nonetheless, in a private letter he sent to Crewe at roughly 
the same time, he expressed his anxiety at the deteriorating imperial situation regarding 
Indian emigration which appeared ‘to daily grow worse’: ‘Canada, the United States and New 
Zealand are all on the point of legislation against the admission of Indians. This will make 
our position here very difficult, unless we are able to find, and you to support, some system 
of reciprocity.’63 
Through June and July, the situation at Vancouver produced the agitation in India that 
many British observers had expected. Protest telegrams, petitions and memorials were sent to 
the Government of India (in most cases, being personally addressed to the Viceroy); the bulk 
of these arose from meetings held in towns and cities across the Punjab. Provincial colonial 
officials were dispatched to investigate and reported back on the attendance at these protest 
meetings (typically no more than 500), their ‘constitution’ (in terms of the social background 
of the leading agitators), and the associations and individuals who had given them their 
support. Greater official attention was given to protestors of ‘social standing’, who were 
understood to carry greater local influence and the involvement of students was carefully 
monitored. In contrast, the participation of petty shopkeepers, traders and other less-educated 
classes  was deemed of lesser concern. The owner of ‘a small soda water factory’ who 
convened a protest meeting in the temple town of Tarn Taran was adjudged ‘of no social or 
political importance’; the organizer of a meeting in Chandigarh, a ‘wood, grass and lime 
contractor’ who held ‘the State gardens at Pinjaur on contract’, was dismissed as ‘a man of no 
particular position, with a tendency to self-advertisement’.64 
Yet the participation of these humbler classes is especially interesting for it hints at 
how far Gurdit’s Singh’s test of imperial citizenship stimulated, via provincial temple and 
social welfare associations and the Punjab’s Western-educated elite, the spread of a unifying 
rights-claiming idiom. The resolution of the Sri Guru Sabha in the strategically important 
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military town of Bannu requested the Government of India to intervene to secure ‘the most 
elementary rights of all British subjects to have free access to all parts of the Empire’.65 The 
Khalsa Diwan of Ambala City, another strategically important military town, reminded the 
Viceroy that ‘Indians are citizens of the British Empire and as such ought to be allowed an 
unobstructed right to live in any part of the British Empire’.66 As well as difference of class, 
the support for Singh’s Canadian mission on occasion transcended religion. A self-
proclaimed mixed ‘mass meeting of Peshawar Citizens of all nationalities’ telegrammed the 
Viceroy to register the common Muslim and Sikh distress at ‘Indian brethren who are 
suffering hardships in claiming their legitimate rights of entry into Canada’.67      
Official fears that Singh’s test of imperial citizenship would radicalize various classes 
of Indian opinion were realized on the Komagata Maru’s return. Soon after the ship departed 
Canadian waters, prominent Indian businessmen and educators based on the Pacific Coast put 
their names to a pamphlet entitled An Open letter to the British Public from the Hindustanis 
of North America. In what the Vancouver Province newspaper labelled a ‘veiled threat’, they 
warned of Sikh desertions in Britain’s Indian army and police force once those aboard the 
Komagata Maru shared their experiences with their brethren back home.68 When the ship 
docked at Budge Budge, near Calcutta, on 29 September, and British officials tried to herd its 
passengers onto a train headed to the Punjab, violence erupted which saw 18 passengers shot 
dead.69 As has been well studied, the revolutionary Indian Ghadar party capitalized on the 
voyage’s dramatic failure to rally Indian opinion in both North America and north India 
behind its call for an Empire-wide rebellion during World War One.70   
For its part, the Government of India dealt with Indian claims to equal imperial 
citizenship in a way that, especially once war had broken out, only exacerbated the Punjab’s 
lurch towards radicalism. The official attitude to such claim-making was revealed by the 
Special Tribunal which investigated the Lahore Conspiracy (as the failed Ghadarite rebellion 
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of 1915 became known). A significant aspect of its findings concerned its interpretation of a 
public meeting in Lahore in August 1913 which had protested Canada’s immigration 
restrictions well before Gurdit Singh launched his ill-fated voyage. The tribunal did not find 
the meeting seditious, regarding there to be ‘nothing illegal in representing grievances’, but it 
noted that ‘an atmosphere of intemperance was most certainly created’ through the 
impassioned language and ‘words of hyperbole’ that some speakers employed, and which in 
hindsight encouraged ‘more violent spirits in the career of deplorable crime which they 
embarked upon’. The Tribunal’s overall conclusion was that constitutional agitation ‘may 
easily drift into intemperate agitation, intemperate agitation into sedition, and sedition into 
active revolutionary methods’71. Such a view informed the wartime deliberations of the 
government that resulted in the infamous Rowlatt Act of 1919.72 Fearful of the ‘drift’ from 
legitimate claim-making into outright rebellion, Britain’s imperial state elected to impinge on 
the rights of Indians further, rather than address what it previously recognized to be their 
legitimate grievances. 
 
Federalist visions of imperial citizenship: the Home Rule for India campaign 
Any examination of the South Asian quest for imperial citizenship would remain incomplete 
if it did not mention one further agitation, which during World War One became the furthest 
India had come towards nationwide political mobilization. In May and June 1914, Annie 
Besant, the Irish-English President of the Theosophical Society in India, protested the 
Komagata Maru incident in London alongside Lala Lajpat Rai, the Indian nationalist who 
had previously been arrested for sedition.73 Besant on the podium, through press interviews 
and through articles, demanded Indians enjoy their full rights as imperial citizens, as 
promised by the 1858 Proclamation; she denounced Australia’s and Canada’s exclusionary 
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immigration policies, rejected the ‘colour bar’ in the imperial civil service, and bemoaned the 
exclusion of India from Imperial Federation discussions in the capital. In a veiled threat she 
shared with an Australian journalist, she claimed: ‘A rude and sudden awakening must come 
if Great Britain and the Empire persist in ignoring India’s just claims for freedom and 
equality. They are loyal at present, but existing conditions are straining their loyalty to 
breaking point.’ 74  
Meanwhile, Lajpat Rai captured the ‘dilemma’ in which the Komagata Maru incident 
placed the British government. In a letter to the London press, he marveled that the  Empire 
was ‘on the threshold of a great agitation’ amongst a once loyal people, the ‘descendants, 
compatriots and co-religionists’ of those who had saved the Empire during the rebellion of 
1857, simply on account of these people seeking to act ‘in exercise of their rights of British 
citizenship’: ‘They [The British Government] want the Indians to believe that they are the 
equal subjects of the King, but when the former claim their rights as such, they behave as if 
they have neither the power nor the desire to secure the same for them.’ Lajpat Rai wondered 
aloud whether the fault was not so much the Government of India’s ‘as of those statesmen 
who have to reconcile their professions and principles of Liberalism with their policy of 
subjection’. He nevertheless warned that there was ‘no half-way house between democracy 
and despotism…, especially since the ‘desire, the ambition, and the necessity of claiming 
British citizenship is no longer confined to educated Indians, but is permeating through the 
uneducated classes and even the masses.’75 
Evidence for his latter claim was eventually provided by Besant’s campaign for 
Indian Home Rule, which she launched from her Madras base at the start of 1914. The 
campaign’s objectives operated at both a high imperial level, in which India took its equal 
place amongst the self-governing Dominions, and at a grounded local level, in which Indians 
were educated to behave as a progressive political citizenry. On the one hand, Besant desired 
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to achieve self-government for India along the lines Ireland had been promised by the 1914 
Government of Ireland Act, which made provisions for an Irish Parliament. She set out her 
Home Rule plan through 1914 and 1915 as part of the overall ‘reconstruction of the Empire’ 
after the War into an ‘Imperial’ and then ‘World Federation’. Her newspapers proclaimed that 
‘the term Empire has broadened to signify a unification of peoples under a single scheme of 
government which should allow its co-ordinated parts the widest possible freedom of 
autonomy’. They challenged the ‘individual Britisher’ to ‘merge his narrow patriotism into a 
wide internationalism’ and the British government to ‘evolve a scheme of imperial rule 
sufficiently plastic to admit of an adequate amount of Self-Government’.76  
On the other hand, within this plan, Besant sought to create an Indian citizenry ‘in 
which each has a voice “with a share of the power of guidance over the things he (or she) 
understands”’. In effect, she advocated a gradated form of universal suffrage, which included, 
as befitted the ideals of a noted British suffragist, the extension of the franchise to Indian 
women. All Indians of 21 years and older would gain the vote, in the sense that they would 
elect village (rural) and ward (urban) panchayats [assemblies] vested with local judicial and 
public works responsibilities. But, ‘as the area become more extensive, and the questions 
arising more complicated, the interests concerned larger and more interdependent… the 
electorates shall diminish in number, greater age and higher education being demanded as 
qualifications.’. Sub-district or Taluq Boards and small municipalities would be elected by 
Indians of 25 years and over who had completed education up to school leaving level. 
Provincial parliaments would be elected by district councilors and all men and women of 35 
years and over who had been ‘educated to the graduate level’. The ‘United States of India’ 
Beasant envisioned would have a national ‘Federal Parliament’ whose membership would be 
elected by the provincial parliaments. This assembly would in turn send elected 
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representatives to the ‘Parliament of Empire’, the highest authority in the coming world 
federation.77 
The inclusive scope of Besant’s mobilization, especially once she eventually launched 
her Home Rule campaign as an explicit protest movement in 1916, was similarly ambitious. 
Local branches of her Theosophical Society located across all three Indian presidencies and 
several provinces, not to mention the Society’s considerable publishing and distribution 
network, enabled her to attain a geographically impressive all-India reach. Initially, however, 
the high membership fees of her Home Rule League meant its social composition remained 
elitist. Besant and her lieutenants similarly directed the League’s ‘programme’ of activism at 
an educated, and particularly Western-educated, audience. Leaguers were encouraged to 
discuss Indian self-government with their friends and persuade them to join movement, to 
collect political facts and opinions, to form debating circles, to organize public lectures, to 
print and circulate pamphlets, and to collect funds. They were additionally instructed to 
establish libraries filled with the ‘nationalist’ writings by Besant herself, and by authors such 
as J. S. Mill and the Cambridge historian J. R. Seeley (who had vigorously debated imperial 
federation and whether India could form part of it).78 Yet as the movement intensified it 
captured supporters from beyond this narrow circle. Copies of Besant’s Home Rule 
newspapers were distributed free or for one anna at railway stations. Her New India 
newspaper, which she published from July 1914 with the slogan (adapted from the Fenians) 
‘England’s need is India’s opportunity’, achieved a readership of 10,000 and above.79 
Colonial officials reported that the paper had ‘a very wide circulation in rural areas generally 
and […] is giving the Home Rule movement a marked impetus among English-knowing 
people of all classes’ with  ‘a specially large circulation in the lower ranks of Government 
service.”80 They became particularly concerned by the circulation of articles from Besant’s 
papers that were published as separate political pamphlets. It was estimated that by 
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September 1916 the Theosophical Publishing House had sold more than 300,000 copies of 
these pamphlets, with titles such as Citizenship, Social Service, Self Government for India 
and Home Rule and Empire. Many of these pamphlets were published in vernacular editions 
with simple explanations of the movement’s objectives.81  
Moreover, to an extent that has been frequently overlooked, Besant’s agitation strove 
to influence the future village citizen who formed such a key part of her Home Rule vision. 
An official government report from the Madras Presidency noted in December 1916: ‘there 
are indications of initiation of a special campaign for village work based mainly on the 
distribution of vernacular pamphlets and the itineration of Home Rule preachers. Hitherto the 
district reports have for the most part pictured the Home Rule movements as confined to 
younger vakils and students in central towns, but in the report from the Guntur district for the 
past fortnight the collector lays stress upon the activities of the League in the delta villages of 
the Tesali taluk.’82 Such village work included the production of posters, illustrated 
postcards, religious songs adapted for political purposes, and even popular dramatic 
performances. It was this work which appears to have ultimately prompted the Madras 
authorities to arrest and intern Besant in June 1917 for sedition. Her arrest only served to 
further popularize her campaign. 83 Her interment was protested by public meetings, 
processions, prayer gatherings, and a Home Rule swadeshi campaign, which eventually 
combined with metropolitan pressure in Britain to secure her release. By the time Besant was 
elected President of the Indian National Congress in December 1917, membership of 
combined Home Rule Leagues across India (despite their high fees) had risen to around 
60,000.84 More importantly, Besant was able to reflect in her presidential address that Home 
Rule had become ‘so intertwined with religion by the prayers offered up in the great Southern 
Temples – sacred places of pilgrimage – and spreading from them to village temples, and also 
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by its being preached, up and down the country, by Sadhus and Sannyasins … And that is 
why I have said that the two words, “Home Rule”, have become a Mantram’.85  
The grassroots nature of Besant’s citizenry-making ambitions is especially revealed 
through the work she and her lieutenants undertook to prepare Indian women for their role as 
equal imperial citizens. In southern India, women featured prominently in the agitation for 
her release, thanks largely to the efforts of the Women’s Indian Association (WIA), which 
Besant and her female allies established a month before she was interned.86 Stri Dharma, the 
WIA’s multi-lingual English-Tamil-Malayalam (and occasionally Telugu) journal, produced 
a range of discussions which branch members were encouraged to debate at local meetings. 
These included female education, ‘Citizenship, the duties of men and women to the 
community’, ‘Why Indian women should have votes’ and ‘Women’s suffrage’ – which 
discussed, amongst other things, the practical issue of how women in purdah could vote 
without having to visit polling stations.87 A key concern of the WIA leadership was that a 
lack of political participation by Indian women, given the changes underway in Britain, might 
present the British Government with a justification for withholding Indian self-government. 
In part, Besant and her Home Rulers promoted women’s suffrage to gain, so Stri Dharma put 
it, the ‘help and sympathy’ of 8,000,000 enfranchised English women, and ‘a large number of 
English men also’.88 
Two further aspects of Besant’s campaign are worth highlighting. The first is the 
considerable support she received from illustrious one-time ‘extremist’ Indian patriots, some 
of whom who had less than a decade earlier derided the moderate nationalist dream of 
imperial federation as unfeasible.89 As we have noted, Lala Lajpat Rai joined Besant’s 
campaign in London in 1914. He then went on to establish the Indian Home Rule League of 
America in 1917. The equally famous former-‘extermist’ Bepin Chandra Pal likewise 
endorsed Besant’s vision of swaraj in articles published in her Home Rule newspapers.90 Her 
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most important ally, however, was Bal Gangadar Tilak, who established his own Home Rule 
League in April 1916, pushing Besant to launch hers a few months later. Although the two 
leaders ran their leagues independently, focusing on different parts of the country, both spoke 
on the same platforms and joined one another’s organizations, as did many of their supporters 
(including the young Jawaharlal Nehru).91 As the language Tilak deployed in his Home Rule 
speeches underlines, he shared the same vision of equal imperial rights for Indians won 
through their wartime allegiance, and he similarly warned, through a Marathi newspaper, that 
if Indians did not receive these rights soon ‘the Empire would be lost’. 92 
The other striking feature of this mobilization was the continuing role that Indian faith 
in the liberal ‘soft heart’ of Empire played within it. That faith was kept alive by the 
friendships and alliances that Besant, the former British socialist, and her Home Rule allies 
forged with left wing and liberal metropolitan sympathizers. In London, Pal became a convert 
to the ‘Empire-ideal’ whilst a member of the social circle of the prominent newspaper man 
W. T. Stead, a proponent of imperial federation.93 Lajpat Rai met the Labour Party leader 
Keir Hardy while in Britain, as well as the Liberal (then Labour) politician Josiah 
Wedgwood, and the Fabians Sidney Webb and George Bernard Shaw (with whom he 
attended a Fabian summer school).94  The climactic moment in Tilak’s Home Rule campaign 
came when he joined Besant in 1918 in London to present India’s demand for self-
government. In Britain, Tilak made donations to the Labour Party (which had announced its 
support in principle, for Indian self-government), attended trade union congresses and 
became friendly with the left-wing leader and imperial federationist George Lansbury, then 
editor of The Herald. Tilak’s plan of action in Britain was for him to work ‘among the higher 
classes of people’ while Besant worked ‘among the Labour Party and women’.95 
Nicoletta Gullace, in her study of Britain’s wartime campaigns for franchise reform, 
has described the First World War as a ‘Great War for citizenship’. It was equally a Great 
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War for imperial citizenship with the year 1918 proving to be the apex of Indian Home 
Rulers’ hopes in the Empire’s liberal centre.96 The Representation of the People Act at that 
year’s start, and the General Election at its end, were eagerly anticipated in India in terms of 
their Empire-wide repercussions, as the farewell speeches for a Madras Home Rule 
delegation sent to Britain ahead of Tilak and Besant reveal. Indian Home Rulers expected 
that the democratic surge transforming the Empire’s heart would flow out to the subcontinent, 
and a victorious British Labour Party to usher in Indian self-government and equal imperial 
citizenship. The prominent Home Ruler C. P. Ramaswamier announced:  
there are two new factors in English politics which are absolutely unparalleled in the history 
of English politics. One is the rise of English woman as a power in the English world. Six 
millions’ of English women have been enfranchised today, and in the next election the 
destinies of the Empire will be partly in their hands…[The second new factor was] the great 
labour democracy, for remember the balance of power is shifting. It is no longer the peer who 
is cultivating his land through his tenantry that is the centre of gravity today, nor is the 
Cambridge or Oxford graduate. It is the man who works with his brain and hand that is 
grasping power in England; and he puts the question what are you doing out in India?97  
 
Rights gone wrong: imperial citizenship as a radicalizing agent 
The agitations we have explored were each in their own ways idealistic failures. From late-
1918 into the following year, the British Labour Party’s poor electoral showing at the General 
Election, the repressive Rowlatt Act, the ‘diarchy’ imposed through the 1919 Government of 
India Act, the Paris Peace Conference negotiations, and the shocking, veil-lifting, violence 
unleashed at the Jallianwallah Bagh in Amritsar on April 13th – all combined to dissolve 
dreams of equal Indian citizenship within a postwar imperial federation. Nonetheless, this 
study has posited that such dreams, and the energy and resources directed towards them, need 
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to be reinserted in narratives of the Indian unmaking of the British Empire, not least because 
of the political consequences of their failure. 
In James Scott’s contestation of Gramscian notions of false consciousness, he 
summarizes arguments presented by the political sociologist Barrington Moore, writing that 
Moore ‘implicitly asks us to imagine a gradient of radicalism’ in the interrogation of the 
dominant stratum’s claim to power by subordinate groups. ‘The least radical step is to 
criticize some members of this dominant stratum for having violated the norms by which they 
claim to rule; the next most radical step is to accuse this entire stratum of failing to observe 
the principles of its rule; and the most radical step is to repudiate the very principles by which 
the dominant stratum justifies its dominance’. 98 While this linear explanation of radicalism 
hardly applies universally, it does help illuminate the career of South Asia’s most influential 
anti-colonialist. To an extent that many accounts have obscured, Gandhi’s political 
campaigns between 1893 and 1919 followed Moore’s evolutionary pattern. Whereas the 
tendency has been to emphasize the dark night of the patriotic soul from which Gandhi 
suddenly emerged following the end of the First World War, into the new revelatory light of 
purna swaraj (complete political independence), his ideological transition from wartime 
Empire-loyalist to postwar passive-resistance hero (nervous breakdown notwithstanding) 
represented less a political volte face more than a clear progression.99 As late as mid-
1918,Gandhi held out hopes for Indian imperial citizenship. He exhorted his ‘Sisters and 
brother of the Kheda district’, immediately following his satyagraha there, to enlist in 
Britain’s armies en masse so that Indians, through their sacrifice, would  ‘secure the rights we 
want’: ‘We want the rights of Englishmen, and we aspire to be as much partners in the 
Empire as the Dominions overseas’.100 When in February 1919 he announced his intention to 
launch a nationwide satyagraha against the Rowlatt Act, he did so still in pursuit of equal 
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imperial subjecthood, describing the new legislation as ‘destructive of the elementary rights 
of individuals’ and ‘subversive of the elementary rights of citizenship’.101 
 The fundamental yet brilliantly simple addition Scott makes to Moore’s formulation, 
one that helps us better understand not only Gandhi but other Indian patriots who pursued 
imperial citizenship, comes when he argues that in the gradient of radicalism the ‘collective 
insistence, through petitioning, on the "rights" to which subordinate groups feel entitled 
carries an understood "or else"’.102 This understood ‘or else’ – the threat of more radical 
action if the principles espoused by the dominant stratum are not adhered to – was an 
essential element of the linked campaigns we have surveyed from their commencement and 
in late-1917 might be said to have reached its comic apotheosis. In November of that year, 
Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, toured the country to assess its readiness for 
‘responsible’ self-government. Besant reportedly surprised Montagu in his tent while he was 
dressing, pressed him to take up the offer of a lift in her motorcar (they were both on their 
way to see the Viceroy), and used their time together to impress upon him that India must be 
granted full control over its own executive political bodies and finances. In doing so she 
made clear that for the cause of Home Rule she had been forced to mobilize Indian students. 
(She had done so, especially in Madras, through her Young Men’s Indian Association). Her 
‘boys’ would continue to forsake anarchy and stick to constitutional reform if Home Rule 
were granted. But if it were not … she left the rest to Montagu’s imagination.103 
 Evidence such as this highlights the historiographical narrowness of certain respected 
scholars who have criticized research into colonized peoples’ aspirations towards imperial 
citizenship and federation because they represent (in hindsight) allegedly fantastic and 
unrealistic alternatives to the independent nation-state. Samuel Moyn, albeit with reference to 
the West Africa context post-1945 rather than our own, has asserted that ‘for the history of 
federalism to be more than trivia, it has to be shown that it was actually possible’.104 Richard 
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Drayton, likewise writing in response to Cooper’s work, has contended that federalism (and 
the imperial citizenship contained in it) was, owing to the reality of imperial power-relations 
‘almost from its beginnings a lie’, a product of the ‘tightly constrained political space of 
colonialism’ and the ‘forced poetics’ of a subjugated political imagination in which the only 
avenue available for the colonized was to ‘do business in the ideological currency of the 
colonial power’.105  
Yet such criticism fails to really address Cooper’s original and critical point 
(reinforced in his response to these critics) that the politics of the rights-concerned claim-
maker and the politics of the romantic anticolonial revolutionary frequently combined in the 
process of decolonization, with the former achieving tangible political gains as the latter 
prepared, sometimes in the wilderness of exile, for the longed-for moment of liberation.106 
Our earlier South Asian context sheds further light on how these two forms of politics 
interacted with and complemented one another. It suggests that that the quest for equal Indian 
citizenship within a future imperial federation contained from the outset the possibility of 
radical action; that it was a goal understood by both its proponents and colonial officials in 
terms of it subversive radicalizing potential (should it fail); that some of its proponents 
mobilized new political groups with that future possibility in mind; and that others (notably 
the revolutionary Ghadarite party) may have considered it a futile yet necessary pursuit if the 
truth about the Empire was to be exposed. Imperial citizenship was certainly ‘almost from its 
beginning a lie’, but a lie that Indians first would have to comprehend and experience if they 
were to be liberated from their imperial false consciousness and set on the path of revolution.     
In this regard, Drayton is on firmer ground when he suggests that some colonized 
leaders may have viewed imperial federation and citizenship more as ‘tactical goals’. In the 
South Asian context, it is the exact nature of these tactical goals that needs clarification. 
British sedition laws undoubtedly made the ostensible Empire-loyalist tone of Besant and 
34 
 
Gandhi’s wartime rights-claiming an attractive proposition – a politics of the feasible, 
especially for former-‘extremists’ such as, Lajpat Rai, Pal and Tilak, who might not have 
fancied, in some cases further, incarceration.107 Nevertheless, official British fears of the 
‘drift’ from legitimate claim-making to anti-colonial rebellion meant even such avowedly 
loyal dissent did not insure against detention. As India’s Department of Criminal Intelligence 
made clear, Besant was ultimately arrested for having spread a theory of agitation in which 
‘any attack on what was called bureaucracy was permissible so long as it was accompanied 
by a perfunctory expression of loyalty to the Crown and the British connection.’108  
More importantly, the imperial rights-claimers we have focused on in the South Asian 
context did not seek out, nor accept, merely the partial fulfilment of their quest for Civis 
Britannicus. Up until the very end, they united in their demand for the full ‘rights of 
Englishmen’ in what became an increasingly all-or-nothing gamble.109 Whether or not the 
reality of the independent nation-state was inevitable, South Asian campaigns for imperial 
citizenship and federation force us to appreciate and understand why these were not merely 
‘hesitations’ upon the long road to full independence, but for extended periods the preferred 
political choice of notable Indian patriots.        
                    
                                                          
1
 Quoted in Randal Hansen, Citizenship and immigration in Postwar Britain: The institutional origins of a 
multicultural nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 251. 
2
 British Nationality Act 1948, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6/11-12/56/enacted. 
Accessed 18 July 2018.  
33
 Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, Subject, citizens, aliens and others: Nationality and immigration law 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1990), pp. 138-39. 
4
 Hansen, Citizenship and immigration, pp. 55-56 
5
 For an excellent account, see ibid. 
6
 On the former, see Daniel Gorman, Imperial citizenship: Empire and the question of belonging (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2006); on the latter see Sukanya Banerjee, Becoming imperial citizens: Indians in 
the late-Victorian Empire (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2010)  
7
 See Claude Markovits’ review of Banerjee, Becoming imperial citizens for H-Asia. https://networks.h-
net.org/node/22055/reviews/22198/markovits-banerjee-becoming-imperial-citizens-indians-late-victorian. 
 
35 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Accessed 18 July 2018. Banerjee, however, pays closer attention the political mobilizations for imperial 
citizenship in her discussion of Gandhi in South Africa.  
8
 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in question: Theory, knowledge, history (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2005), pp. 231-32 
9
 Frederick Cooper, Citizenship between empire and nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 432 
10
 Hansen, Citizenship and immigration, pp. 38-39 
11
 See Michael H. Fisher, Counterflows to colonialism: Indian travelers and settlers in Britain, 1600-1857 
(Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004), pp 169-71 
12
 Rozinha Visram, Ayahs, lascars and princes: The story of Indians in Britain, 1700-1947 (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2015) 
13
 Cambridge University Library [hereafter CUL], Hardinge Papers 87, Gillen to DuBoulay, 11 June 1914, 
Correspondence with Persons in India, vol. 7, pp. 412-14   
14
 ‘Indian Affairs’, The Times, 7 April 1896. The claim that Indians might also be ‘civilisers’ was made by Sir 
Lepel Griffin while presiding over a meeting of the East India Association that discussed Indian emigration to 
Africa; see ‘India and Africa’, The Times 24 June 1896. 
15
 Quoted in Gorman, Imperial citizenship, p. 33, n. 69 
16
 Mark R. Frost, ‘Transcultural diaspora: The Straits Chinese in Singapore, 1819-1918. Asia Research Working 
Paper No. 10. https://ari.nus.edu.sg/Assets/repository/files/publications/wps03_010.pdf. Accessed 18 July 2018; 
see also Frost, ‘Emporium in imperio: Nanyang networks and the Straits Chinese in Singapore 1819-1914’, 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 36, 1 (2005): 29-66 
17
 See Appendix to His Majesty King George’s Speeches in India, 2nd edition (Madras: Natesan, 1911), pp. xvi-
xxvii 
18
 ‘Editor’s Note’ to E. B. Sargent, British Citizenship, an inquiry as to its meaning (London: Royal Colonial 
Institute, 1911) 
19
 Bishopsgate Institute, George Howell Archive, HOWELL/9/4 part 2, election handbill 1895  
20
 Quoted in Sumita Mukherjee, ‘“Narrow-majority” and “Bown-and-agree”: Public attitudes towards the 
elections of the First Asian MPs in Britain, Dadabhai Naoroji and Macherjee Merwanjee Bhownaggreee, 1885-
1906, Journal of the Oxford History Society, 2 (Michaelmas 2004): 1-20, 6 
21
 David Arnold, Gandhi (Harlow: Longman, 2001), p. 52 
22
 Arnold in ibid. and Bannerjee’s Becoming imperial citizens do not explore these dimensions. Nor do Judith 
Brown, Gandhi’s rise to power: Indian politics, 1915-1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974); or, 
more recently, Ramachandra Guha, Gandhi before India (London: Penguin, 2014)  
23
 ‘Letter to the Natal Advertiser, 29 Sep 1893’ and ‘The Indian Franchise’, Collected Works of Mahatma 
Gandhi [hereafter CWMG] (Electronic Book, New Delhi, 1998), pp. 62-63, 283-307. Available at 
http://gandhiserve.org/e/cwmg/cwmg.htm. Accessed 18 Jul 2018. 
24
 ‘Letter to the Natal Mercury, 2 Sep 1895’, ibid. pp. 269-70 
25
 ‘Interview to the Natal Advertiser, 13 Jan 1897’, CWMG  2, pp. 1-9 
26
 ‘Speech at meeting, Madras, 26 Oct 1896’, CWMG 1, 1896, p. 426-48, 437 
27
 Nicholas Owen, ‘The soft heart of the British Empire: Indian radicals in Edwardian London’, Past and 
Present 220, 1 (2013):143-84 
28
 ‘The Indian Franchise’; see also Richard Simms, ‘In memory of The Star (1888-1960)’, An Index to the 
Fiction Published in The Star website. http://thestarfictionindex.atwebpages.com/the.htm. Accessed 18 Jul 2018 
29
 Editorial, The Times, 30 Aug 1895 
30
 ‘Indian Affairs’, The Times, 24 Jun 1895 
31
 See Hunter’s ‘Indian Affairs’ columns in The Times, 4 Sep 1895, 27 Jan 1896, and 24 Jun 1895 
32
 See, inter alia, Gandhi’s, ‘The Indian franchise’; also ‘Memorial to Natal Legislative Assembly’, ‘Memorial 
to J. Chamberlain’, and ‘The grievances of the British Indians in South Africa: An appeal to the Indian public’, 
CWMG 1, pp. 328-32, 337-55, 359-407   
33
 ‘Letter to the Natal Mercury, 2 Sep 1895’ 
34
 ‘Indian Affairs’, The Times, 16 Mar 1896, original italics. 
35
 ‘Interview to the Natal Advertiser, 13 Jan 1897’ 
36
 ‘India makes the empire’, Indian Opinion 20 Aug 1904, reprinted in CWMG 4, pp. 52-53  
37
 ‘Indian Affairs’, The Times, 27 Jan 1896 
38
 Editorial, ibid., 10 Nov 1906. This editorial was prompted by the failure of Gandhi’s deputation to Whitehall, 
in protest at the implementation of the Transvaal Act, to draw anything more than private apologies and official 
handwringing.  
 
36 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
39
 Quoted in Roger Daniels, ‘The growth of restrictive immigration policies in the Colonies of Settlement’, in 
Robin Cohen (ed.), The Cambridge survey of world migration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
p. 40 
40
 David C. Atkinson, The burden of white supremacy: Containing Asian migration in the British Empire and 
the United States (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), pp. 19-48  
41
 The National Archives CO 885/6/30, C8596, ‘Proceedings of a |Conference between the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies and the Premiers of the Self-Governing Colonies at the Colonial Office London, June and July 
1897’, pp. 13-14 
42
 Dummett and Nicol, Subjects, Citizens, pp. 120-21; Atkinson, The burden of white supremacy, pp. 43-48  
43
 Minutes of Proceedings of the Colonial Conference, 1907. Cd. 3523 (London: HMSO, 1907), pp. 175-6, 538-
39 
44
 Ibid., pp. 178-82, 534-40 
45
 Minutes of the proceedings of the Imperial Conference, 1911. Cd. 5745 (London: HMSO, 1911), pp. 249-56, 
262 
46
 Ibid., pp. 257, 270 
47
 Ibid., pp. 394-99. Crewe’s warning received short shrift from the Dominion leaders. Laurier claimed that the 
entry of cheap Indian labour to Canada was so potentially disruptive to local labour conditions that it was, in 
fact, the real threat to imperial unity.  Lee Batchelor, the Australian Minister for External Affairs argued 
that ’the mixture of black and white races…would tend to a disunited Empire rather than a united Empire’. F. R. 
Malan remarked that for South Africa, ‘it is not so much a question of labour as a question of self-preservation’, 
by which he meant the demographic survival of a white population already outnumbered by non-Europeans, for 
whom Indian immigration would pose a further threat. See ibid., 399-410.  
48
 Arnold, Gandhi, p. 60 
49
 Hugh Johnston, The voyage of the Komagata Maru: The Sikh challenge to Canada’s colour bar (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1979), p.33 
50
 Dummett and Nicol, Subjects, citizens, pp. 120-21  
51
 Gurdit Singh, Voyage of the Komagatamaru or India’s slavery abroad, (Calcutta: Author, 1928), pp.15-16 
52
 Johnston, The voyage, pp. 19-23; Steve Schwinghamer ‘“The Immigration Act a weapon”: Panama Maru and 
the exclusion of immigrants, 1913’. Canadian Museum of Immigration at Pier 21 website, 
https://pier21.ca/blog/steve-schwinghamer/panama-maru-and-the-exclusion-of-immigrants-1913. Accessed 18 
Jul 2018. 
53
 Singh, Voyage of the Komagatamaru, p. 16 
54
 British Library, India Office Records [hereafter IOR], L/PJ/6/1325, Judicial and Political Department, 
translation of notice for voyage, Despatch No. 101, 26 Jun 1914, pp.19-20. Italics added. 
55
 Quoted in Johnston, The voyage, p. 30 
56
 IOR L/PJ/6/1325, Judicial and Political Department, clippings from The Province for 16 and 17 Apr 1914, 
Despatch No. 101, 26 Jun 1914, pp. 21-23 
57
 IOR L/PJ/6/1325, Judicial and Political Department, Conygham Greene to Foreign Office, 13 May 1914, 
Despatch No. 141, 7 Aug 1914, pp. 3-4 
58
 ‘Four Hundred Hindus’, The Tribune, 29 Apr 1914, reprinted in Malwinderjit Singh Waraich and Gurdev 
Singh Sidhu (ed) Komagata Maru – a challenge to colonialism: Key Documents (Chandigarh: UNISTAR, 2005) 
p. 83. 
59
 IOR L/PJ/1325, Judicial and Political Department, London All-India Moslem League to Colonial Office, 18 
Jun 1914, Despatch No. 141, pp. 11-12 
60
 CUL, Crewe Papers I.17.12, draft telegram from Crewe to Hardinge, sent 9 Jun 1914 
61
 CUL, Hardinge Papers 87, Gillan to DuBoulay, 11 Jun 1914, Correspondence with Persons in India, vol. 7, 
pp. 412-14 
62
 CUL Crewe Papers I.17.12, copy of return telegram (written) from Hardinge, received 12 June 1914 
63
 CUL, Hardinge Papers 120, Hardinge to Crewe, 11 Jun 1914, Correspondence with the Secretary of State for 
India, vol. 4, pp. 95-98  
64
 IOR L/PJ/6 file 1324, Judicial and Political Department, ‘“Komagata Maru” Resolutions from Public 
Meetings in India’. See especially: copy of telegram from Mr Nanak Chand, Chairman, Public Meeting of the 
Citizens of Lahore, 9 Jul 1914; copy of paragraph 14 of the ‘Confidential Weekly Diary’ of the Superintendent 
of Policy, Lahore, for week ending 13 Jun 1914; copy of telegram, dated Tarn Taran 13 Jun 1914; translated 
note of petition (in Urdu) from Baba Nihal Singh Vedi of Chandigarh (Ambala, Punjab), 2 Jun 1914; report of 
R. A. Mant (Financial Secretary to Government of Punjab), 18 Aug 1914; report of J. S. Donald, Chief 
Commissioner of North-West Frontier Province, 31 Aug 1914. See also, J. S Grewal, Master Tara Singh in 
Indian history: Colonialism, nationalism, and the politics of Sikh identity (New Delhi: Oxford Univ Press, 
 
37 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2017), pp 73-74 Malwinderjit Singh Waraich and Gurdev Singh Sidhu (eds) Komagata Maru – a challenge to 
colonialism: Key documents (Chandigarh: UNISTAR, 2005), pp. 56-57.   
65
‘“Komagata Maru” Resolutions from Public Meetings in India’: copy of resolution passed by the Sri Guru 
Singh Sabha, Bannu, 21 Jun 1914; report of J. S. Donald, Chief Commissioner of North-West Frontier Province, 
31 Aug 1914. 
66
 Ibid., copy of letter from Sardar Jhanda Singh, Pleader Secretary of Khalsa Miandoab Diwan, 21 Jul 1914 
67
 Ibid., copy of telegram from secretary of public meeting held at Peshawar, dated 27 Jul 1914. Colonial 
officials recorded an actual ‘mixed audience’ at this meeting of around 250 (see report of J. S. Donald, Chief 
Commissioner of North-West Frontier Province, 31 Aug 1914). 
68
 As quoted in a ‘Veiled Threat is made by Hindus’, Vancouver Province, 8 Aug 1914, reprinted in Wariach an 
Sidhu (eds), Komagata Maru: Key documents, pp. 102-3 
69
 Johnston, The voyage, pp. 92-103 
70
 Maia Ramnath, Haj to utopia: How the Ghadar movement charted global radicalism and attempted to 
overthrow the British Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011) pp. 48-9; Waraich and Sidhu 
(eds), Komagata Maru: Key documents, pp. 235-41 
71
 The Special Tribunal; Judgement in Second Supplementary Case Dated 5th January 1917, reprinted in 
Waraich and Sidhu (eds), Komagata Maru: Key documents, pp. 230-41, 234-35 
72
 See especially IOR/V/26/262/2, Sedition Report 1918 (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1918)  
73
 Both had travelled to London to resolve separate legal actions directed at themselves and their associates. 
74
 ‘India and the Empire’, The Times, 29 May 1914; and ‘India and Australia – an interview with Mrs Annie 
Besant’, The British-Australasian 28 May 1914, reprinted in Annie Besant, India and the Empire: A lecture and 
various papers on Indian grievances (London: Theosophical Publishing House, 1914), pp. 25-29, 30-39  
75
 Lala Lajpat Rai, ‘A greater measure of self-government’, Daily News and Leader, 10 Jun 1914, reprinted in 
Besant, India and the Empire, pp. 88-93 
76
 ‘The Commonweal of the world: international association 1, The Commonweal, 30 Jan 1914; ‘The imperial 
ideal’, ibid., 30 Jan 1914; ‘Invitation to conference on the formation of the League for Self-government’, ibid., 
17 Dec 1915 
77
 Annie Besant, India: A Nation - a Plea for Self Government, 1st ed, (London, T. C and E.C. Jack, 1916), pp. 
89-91 
78
 H. F. Owen, ‘Towards nationwide agitation and organization: the Home Rule Leagues, 1915-18, in D. A. Low 
(ed), Soundings in Modern South Asian history (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968), pp. 159-95 
79
 J. Ransom, A Short History of the Theosophical Society (Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1938), p. 
409 
80
 Fortnightly report from Madras, 18 Dec 1916, quoted in Brown, Gandhi’s rise to power, pp. 27-28  
81
 Owen, ‘Towards Nation-wide Agitation’; J. S. Mortimer, ‘Annie Besant and India, 1913-1917’, Journal of 
Contemporary History 18, 1 (1983): 61-78. The holdings of the Adyar Oriental Library of the Theosophical 
Society in India include the Home Rule Grantha Mala (Malayalam) Series, published by the Malabar Provincial 
Home Rule League and the Mahajana Sabha in Calicut. 
82
 Fortnightly report from Madras, 18 Dec 1916  
83
 Ibid., pp. 27-29; Mortimer, ‘Annie Besant and India’; Owen, ‘Towards nation-wide agitation’. On the 
decision to release Besant see Peter Robb, ‘The government of India and Annie Besant’, Modern Asian Studies 
10, 1 (1976): 107-30. 
84
 Owen, ‘Towards nation-wide agitation’. This figure includes membership of Tilak’s Home Rule League, 
discussed below. 
85
 Annie Besant, The case for India – Presidential address to the Indian National Congress, 1917  (London: 
Home Rule for India League, 1917), pp. 31-32  
86
 IOR Mss Eur F341/33, Women’s Indian Association: Golden Jubilee Celebration, 1917-1967 (Madras: WIA, 
1967), pp. 1-2 
87
 D. Jinarajadasa, ‘Suggestions for conducting a branch meeting’, Stri Dharma, Jan 1918, pp. 7-8; and 
‘Women’s Suffrage’, ibid., Jan 1919, pp. 63-64; Mithan A. Tata, ‘Why Indian women should have votes’, ibid. 
May 1918, pp. 37-39   
88
 Jinarajadasa, ‘Women’s suffrage’ 
89
 As Pal pointed out, in a 1907 speech to Madras students: ‘if we have the rights of freedom of the Empire as 
Australia has, as Canada has, as England has herself today, if we, the 300 millions of people, have that freedom 
of the Empire, the Empire would cease to be British. It would be the Indian Empire and the alliance between 
England and India would be absolutely an unequal alliance’. Bepin Chandra Pal, Speeches of Srj. Bepin 
Chandra Pal (delivered at Madras) (Madras: Ganesh, 1907), p.43.  
 
38 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
90
 Bepin Chandra Pal, ‘Indian nationalism and the British Empire: 1. Autonomy versus independence’, The 
Commonweal, 28 Apr 1916 
91
 Owen, ‘Towards nation-wide agitation’; A. H. Nethercot, The first five lives of Annie Besant (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1960), pp. 250-51 
92
 Bal Gangadur Tilak, Lokmanya Bal Gangadur Tilak, his writings and speeches (Madras: Ganesh, 1920), pp 
228-49. On Tilak’s veiled threat see V. D. Divekar (ed)., Lokmanya Tilak in England, 1918-1919: Diary ad 
documents (Pune: Tilak Smarak Trust 1997), p. 41. 
93
 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White men’s countries and the question 
of racial equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 250-51 
94
 Feroz Chand, Lajpat Rai, life and work (New Delhi: Government of India, 1978) pp. 89, 259-61 
95
 Divekar (ed)., Lokmanya Tilak in England, pp. 193, 577. On Indian ties with the British Left more generally 
see Nicholas Owen, The British Left and India: Metropolitan anti-imperialism, 1885-1947 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), pp. 78-105. 
96
 Nicoletta F. Gullace, ‘The Blood of our Sons’: Men, women and the renegotiation of British citizenship during 
the Great War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 117-41 
97
 ‘The Home Rule League Deputation’, New India, 8 Mar 1918  
98
 James Scott, Domination and the arts of resistance: Hidden transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1990), pp. 91-92; see also, Barrington Moore, Injustice: The social bases of obedience and revolt [first 
published in 1978] (Abingdon: Routledge 2016) 
99
 Erik H. Erikson, Gandhi’s truth: On the origins militant nonviolence, [first published 1970] (New York: W. 
W. Norton, 1993), pp. 227-393; Arnold, Gandhi, pp. 104-114. An exception is Brown, Gandhi’s rise to power, 
pp. 246-49.  
100
 ‘Appeal for enlistment: leaflet No. 1, 22 Jun 1918’ and ‘Appeal for enlistment: leaflet No. 2, 22 Jul 1918’, 
CWMG 17, pp. 83-87, 139-42 
101
 The Satyagraha Pledge’, CWMG 16, p. 297; Telegram to Viceroy, (after) 24 Feb 1919, CWMG 17, p. 299 
102
 Scott, Domination, p. 95 
103
 Nethercot, First five lives, pp. 269-70 
104
 Samuel Moyn, ‘Fantasies of federalism’, Dissent, Winter 2015. 
 https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/fantasies-of-federalism. Accessed 19 Jul 2018 
105
 Richard Drayton, ‘Federal utopias and the realities of imperial power, Comparative Studies in South Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East 37, 2 (2017): 401-406 
106
 Frederick Cooper, ‘Routes out of empire’, in ibid.: 406-11 
107
 The constraints which British official definitions of sedition placed on Indian political language are discussed 
in Robert Darnton, Censors at work: How states shape literature (London: The British Library, 2014), pp. 114-
42. However, the motivations of prominent wartime imperial federationists cannot merely be reduced to their 
desire to operate within colonial laws. For the cosmopolitan idealism which underpinned such dreams see Mark 
R. Frost, ‘“Beyond the limits of nation and geography’: Rabindranath Tagore and the cosmopolitan moment, 
1916-1920’, Cultural Dynamics 24, 2-3 (2012): 143-58.  
108
 Quoted in Richard J. Popplewell, Intelligence and imperial defence: British intelligence and the defence of 
the Indian Empire (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p. 190 
109
 Besant and Tilak’s Home Rule alliance ultimately fell apart by early 1919 over the former’s eventual retreat 
from this stance following the release of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report.  
 
Secondary Sources 
David Arnold, Gandhi (Harlow: Longman, 2001) 
David C. Atkinson, The burden of white supremacy: Containing Asian migration in the British Empire and the 
United States (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2016) 
Sukanya Banerjee, Becoming imperial citizens: Indians in the late-Victorian Empire (Durham NC: Duke 
University Press, 2010) 
Judith Brown, Gandhi’s rise to power: Indian politics, 1915-1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1974) 
Feroz Chand, Lajpat Rai, life and work (New Delhi: Government of India, 1978) 
Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in question: Theory, knowledge, history (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2005) 
______________, Citizenship between empire and nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014) 
______________, ‘Routes out of empire’, Comparative Studies in South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 37, 2 
(2017): 406-11 
 
39 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Roger Daniels, ‘The growth of restrictive immigration policies in the Colonies of Settlement’, in Robin Cohen 
(ed.), The Cambridge survey of world migration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 
Robert Darnton, Censors at work: How states shape literature (London: The British Library, 2014) 
V. D. Divekar (ed)., Lokmanya Tilak in England, 1918-1919: Diary ad documents (Pune: Tilak Smarak Trust 
1997) 
Richard Drayton, ‘Federal utopias and the realities of imperial power, Comparative Studies in South Asia, Africa 
and the Middle East 37, 2 (2017): 401-406 
Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, Subject, citizens, aliens and others: Nationality and immigration law 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1990) 
Erik H. Erikson, Gandhi’s truth: On the origins militant nonviolence, [first published 1970] (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1993) 
Michael H. Fisher, Counterflows to colonialism: Indian travelers and settlers in Britain, 1600-1857 (Delhi: 
Permanent Black, 2004) 
Mark R. Frost, ‘Transcultural diaspora: The Straits Chinese in Singapore, 1819-1918. Asia Research Working 
Paper No. 10. https://ari.nus.edu.sg/Assets/repository/files/publications/wps03_010.pdf. 
____________, ‘Emporium in imperio: Nanyang networks and the Straits Chinese in Singapore 1819-1914’, 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 36, 1 (2005): 29-66 
____________, ‘“Beyond the limits of nation and geography’: Rabindranath Tagore and the cosmopolitan 
moment, 1916-1920’, Cultural Dynamics 24, 2-3 (2012): 143-58 
Daniel Gorman, Imperial citizenship: Empire and the question of belonging (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2006) 
Ramachandra Guha, Gandhi before India (London: Penguin, 2014) 
Nicoletta F. Gullace, ‘The Blood of our Sons’: Men, women and the renegotiation of British citizenship during 
the Great War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 
Randal Hansen, Citizenship and immigration in Postwar Britain: The institutional origins of a multicultural 
nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
Hugh Johnston, The voyage of the Komagata Maru: The Sikh challenge to Canada’s colour bar (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1979) 
Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White men’s countries and the question of 
racial equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
Barrington Moore, Injustice: The social bases of obedience and revolt [first published in 1978] (Abingdon: 
Routledge 2016) 
Samuel Moyn, ‘Fantasies of federalism’, Dissent, Winter 2015. 
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/fantasies-of-federalism. 
Sumita Mukherjee, ‘“Narrow-majority” and “Bown-and-agree”: Public attitudes towards the elections of the 
First Asian MPs in Britain, Dadabhai Naoroji and Macherjee Merwanjee Bhownaggreee, 1885-1906, Journal of 
the Oxford History Society, 2 (Michaelmas 2004): 1-20 
A. H. Nethercot, The first five lives of Annie Besant (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1960) 
H. F. Owen, ‘Towards nationwide agitation and organization: the Home Rule Leagues, 1915-18, in D. A. Low 
(ed), Soundings in Modern South Asian history (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968), pp. 159-95 
Nicholas Owen, ‘The soft heart of the British Empire: Indian radicals in Edwardian London’, Past and Present 
220, 1 (2013):143-84 
Richard J. Popplewell, Intelligence and imperial defence: British intelligence and the defence of the Indian 
Empire (London: Frank Cass, 1995) 
Maia Ramnath, Haj to utopia: How the Ghadar movement charted global radicalism and attempted to 
overthrow the British Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011) 
J. Ransom, A Short History of the Theosophical Society (Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1938) 
Steve Schwinghamer ‘“The Immigration Act a weapon”: Panama Maru and the exclusion of immigrants, 1913’. 
Canadian Museum of Immigration at Pier 21 website, https://pier21.ca/blog/steve-schwinghamer/panama-maru-
and-the-exclusion-of-immigrants-1913. 
James Scott, Domination and the arts of resistance: Hidden transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1990) 
Richard Simms, ‘In memory of The Star (1888-1960)’, An Index to the Fiction Published in The Star website. 
http://thestarfictionindex.atwebpages.com/the.htm 
Rozinha Visram, Ayahs, lascars and princes: The story of Indians in Britain, 1700-1947 (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2015) 
Malwinderjit Singh Waraich and Gurdev Singh Sidhu (eds) Komagata Maru – a challenge to colonialism: Key 
Documents (Chandigarh: UNISTAR, 2005) 
 
40 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
